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THE "ACTUAL STATE OF THINGS":
TEACHING ABOUT LAW
IN POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
DAVID E. WILKINS*
Vine Deloria, Jr., the most prolific Native writer and one of the most
gifted intellectuals in American history, left a deep imprint in many of the
fields he so artfully plowed, including: education, religion, politics, cultural
critic, history, and indigenous knowledge. His scholarship on specific sub-
jects came in waves, with each wave building upon the previous one before
reaching its remarkable crest.
Deloria's scholastic and pragmatic legacy in federal Indian law and
policy and indigenous governance is one that has produced several major
booksl and numerous articles,2 which, in the pantheon of Deloria's prodi-
gious body of works, rank highly in terms of their quality, clarity, and im-
portance. He has influenced a wide body of legal works including treaties,
*Professor of American Indian Studies, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Law, and
American Studies, University of Minnesota; Ph.D., 1990, University of North Carolina/Chapel
Hill. I want to thank Matthew Fletcher for the invitation to participate in the conference and Kara
Gansmann for her excellent editorial skills in getting my article in shape for publication.
1. See, e.g., THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND BILLS (Vine Deloria, Jr.
ed., Univ. of Okla. Press 2002); 1 & 2 VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE,
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS,
1775-1979 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1999) [hereinafter I & 2 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY]; VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES,
TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (Univ. of Tex. Press 1999); VINE DELORIA, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Univ. of Okla. Press 1985); THE
AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S (Vine Deloria, Jr. &
Sandra L. Cadwalader eds., Temple Univ. Press 1984); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M.
LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
(Pantheon Books 1984); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE (Univ. of Tex. Press 1983).
2. See, e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr., The Application of the Constitution to American Indians, in
EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 281-315 (Oren R. Lyons & John C. Mohawk eds., Clear Light
Publishers 2002); Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 203-23 (1989) [hereinafter
Deloria, Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity]; Vine Deloria, Jr., Beyond the Pale: American
Indians and the Constitution, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 249-268 (Jules Lobel ed., Monthly Review Press 1988); VINE DELORIA,
JR., AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 239-256 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed.,
Univ. of Okla. Press 1985); Vine Deloria, Jr., The Distinctive Status of Indian Rights, in THE
PLAINS INDIANS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 237-48 (Peter Iverson ed., 2d prtg. 1985); VINE
DELORIA, JR., THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S
105-30 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., Temple Univ. Press 1984); Vine Deloria,
Jr., Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 Edition, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 121,
121-42 (1982) (book review).
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international law, and legal analysis as a whole. Deloria's scholarship
provides crisp analysis of the convoluted political and legal dimensions of
indigenous status, while simultaneously exploring the intergovernmental
relationship of tribal nations and their status as original sovereign
governments of the Americas.
Deloria received formal academic training in general science (B.S.
1958), theology (L.L.B. 1963), and law (J.D. 1972). As anyone familiar
with his work knows, he fluidly employed elements of each of these intel-
lectual frameworks and methodologies along with his own self-education in
numerous other fields throughout the rest of his days. For purposes of this
essay, however, I want to focus on his understanding of how the law is
taught, how it should be taught, and how his profound influence affects the
way I teach my courses in indigenous politics and governance and the U.S.
Supreme Court.3
Deloria opted not to consistently practice law,4 but instead he liberally
critiqued legal decisions, reviewed popular federal Indian law casebooks,
and taught a number of courses at the University of Arizona and later the
University of Colorado at Boulder in the departments of History and
Political Science. In addition, at various times, he taught in the law schools
of both institutions as well. When I entered the special M.A. degree
program in 1980, a terminal Master's degree called American Indian Policy
Studies that Deloria had created in the political science department at the
University of Arizona in 1979, I quickly discovered that Deloria had
designed a curriculum that was equal parts politics, policy, law, and history.
He emphasized in each of the classes I had with him that in order to
understand the contemporary status of indigenous nations, students needed
a deep, unvarnished, and unrelenting exposure and immersion in each of
these four fields. Furthermore, Deloria placed special importance on
history, along with a liberal dose of geography, education, anthropology,
and economics. The justification for this unique program under the rubric
of political science, as opposed to law, was outlined by Deloria in the
department's graduate student handbook in 1981:
3. Of course, as a student of Deloria's in the early 1980s, and as one who maintained a
relationship with him throughout the years, his influence, in fact, colors all the courses that I
teach, whether in United States or American Indian politics, federal Indian policy, comparative
indigenous peoples, tribal government, minority peoples, etc.
4. Deloria was a vital expert witness during the trials that followed the American Indian
Movement's takeover of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1973. E.g., United States v. Banks,
Unites States v. Means, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D. 1974). He was also a plaintiff in the trademark
case against the Washington Redskin's football team, Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp.
2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
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Political Science offers the most comprehensive context in which
federal Indian policy can be explored and understood. No law
school in the United States has more than one or two courses in the
field of Indian law. Most of these courses are experimental or deal
with complex issues in a generalized survey that cannot possibly
deal adequately with the history and development of the major
concepts now defining and influencing the field of Indian Affairs.
Political Science combines the insights and knowledge of history,
law, political philosophy, and comparative systems and thus en-
ables the student to understand the complexity of issues by using a
wide and significant variety of tools for analysis. Tribal govern-
ments have traditionally called upon the professional anthro-
pologist, sociologist, educator, and economist for their informa-
tion, forgetting that the basic relationship of their governments and
programs to the federal government is a political relationship
formed historically according to certain basic interpretations of
the nature of society and government. Political Science deals
precisely with these topics and thus presents the most compre-
hensive and intelligible context for discussing both problems and
solutions. 5
Deloria stressed that a new kind of academic was being groomed via this
unique program: the Policy Specialist. Those who successfully finished the
two-year program, Deloria argued, would be well trained to navigate
multiple academic fields and would therefore become useful employees of
tribal governments or other governments or organizations. This new
"Policy Specialist" would be capable of conducting such tasks as preparing
reports for land disputes, solving boundary problems, resolving fishing
rights controversies, interpreting treaty rights, and developing tribal sover-
eignty concepts and programs, among other topics.
The curriculum included many courses, but the crux of the program
was a two-semester core course, Politics 484a-484b titled "Development of
Federal Indian Policy," which was required of all students. This two-part
course's principal purpose was to "provide a chronological framework and
theoretical context in which policies, programs, and events can be seen
interacting with each other to produce the cumulative body of treaties,
statutes, and court decisions which define the present configuration of the
5. DEP'T OF POLITICAL SC., UNIV. OF ARIZ., GRADUATE STUDENT'S HANDBOOK 27 (1981)
(unpublished, copy on file with author) (emphasis added).
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federal-Indian relationship." 6 Additionally, the two sequential courses also
functioned to provide a setting:
[I]n which the role, task, and scope of capability of the Policy
Specialist is explored; to give students a fundamental knowledge
of federal Indian policy as it has developed historically and
conceptually; to demonstrate the variety of research sources which
policy questions require; and to encourage the student to construct
models in which policies can be studied and evaluated. 7
The first semester of the course focused on the origin and development
of the various legal, political, and philosophical concepts that overarch and
underlay the policies developed first by the competing European colonial
powers and later developed by the United States to the year 1871-the year
Congress enacted the treaty termination measure. Concepts such as the
"doctrine of discovery, papal authority, the trust doctrine, [and] the role of
federalism," were critiqued and analyzed. The second semester addressed
the policies, laws, and political machinations of the federal and state
governments from 1871 to the present time, with an emphasis on the post-
World War II period.
Besides this important pair of courses, Deloria and the other faculty he
helped assemble8 taught a bevy of seminars, many of which he created, that
dealt with specific topics of historical and contemporary importance to
tribal nations. Some course titles included: "Congress and the American
Indian," "Indian Educational Policies," "American Indians & the Supreme
Court," "Tribal Governments, Indians and the Judicial Process," "Indian
Water Rights," "Indian Claims," and the course that left the deepest
impression on me, "Indian Treaties."
The Treaties course critically examined the historical, political, cul-
tural, and legal evolution of these vital documents from pre-colonial times
to the present. And while Indian treaties constituted the core of the course,
what I obtained from the course was so much more than just the documents
themselves. It was an intense, comprehensive, yet historically and legally
detailed course that was by far the most intellectually challenging and
emotionally demanding course I had ever had, or would ever have,
including my Ph.D. years in political science at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
6. Id. at 29.
7. Id.
8. Among the faculty he recruited for the program were historian Thomas Holm (Cherokee-
Creek) and Robert K. Thomas (Cherokee), a well known anthropologist. Professor Clifford Lytle,
a specialist in constitutional law and American institutions, was already well entrenched in the
department. He and Deloria would later author several books together.
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For Deloria, history, culture, philosophy, and politics created the broad
canvas on which the various diplomatic and treaty arrangements between
indigenous nations and foreign powers, including the United States, were
developed. For Deloria, it was this diverse body of diplomatic accords,
rooted in the political, not legal, concept of "consent," that formed the
exquisite intergovernmental, intercultural, and interracial relations tapestry
that make the study of Native politics and law so fascinating.9 Thus, the
Treaties seminar entailed a comprehensive assessment of the history of
treaty-making, from traditional practices between tribal nations to colonial
arrangements between European powers (e.g., France, Spain, and England)
and tribal peoples, to Revolutionary War treaties, early state treaties,
Removal treaties, Western trade treaties, Civil War treaties, Peace
Commission documents, the "end" of treaty making in 1871,10 railroad
agreements, General Allotment agreements, Claims Commission adjust-
ments, and many negotiated settlements of the 1970s to the present.
After conducting a sweeping introduction of the substantial body of
unique treaties, the course then focused on specific treaty concepts. For
example concepts included: the nature and grounds of obligation; the power
to make treaties; the duration, suspension, and termination of treaties;
conflicts between treaties; constitutions; laws and ordinances; modification;
abrogation; and the dissolution of treaties. Within this context, faculty
lectures were structured around how these issues had been addressed in case
law. Given this base, lectures centered on an assessment of special doc-
trines, including the status of treaties, the construction and interpretation of
treaty language, the rights created by treaties, and congressional powers and
limitations.
As a class, my fellow students and I next read a wide cross section of
law review articles that examined specific treaties or treaty concepts. And
then we moved into a case study phase that critically examined several
tribes and specific treaty arrangements in detail. Case studies included: the
Northern Paiute of Central Oregon, the Treaty of Fort Laramie, and the
fishing rights of tribes of the Northwest. Once the case study phase was
complete, we then engaged in a comparative examination of key treaty pro-
visions involving fishing rights, educational provisions, and jurisdictional
9. Deloria, Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity, supra note 2, at 219.
10. Deloria, among others, has long argued that treaty-making did not, in fact, end in 1871,
but rather was a transformed process. See generally I & 2 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY, supra note I (containing several chapters, most notably
chapter 6 in volume 1, in which they convincingly argue that the diplomatic process, while altered
after 1871, still constituted ongoing political negotiations that entail diplomacy).
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clauses. Finally, we read several essays that addressed treaties from a
literary and cultural perspective.
By the time the course was over, we knew that we had received a
thorough grounding in the distinctive diplomatic-political and moral-
relationship between tribal nations and the other polities the tribes dealt
with and continue to engage. Unlike the manner in which many federal
Indian law classes are currently taught in law schools, the federal and state
case law that we read was used largely to supplement the broad intergov-
ernmental relationship that formed the conceptual and historical parameters
of the course as Deloria had constructed it. This is critical because it con-
firms the extra-constitutional status of indigenous nations as the original
sovereigns of the Americas and does not treat tribal nations as merely one
of several ethnic groups.
As Deloria noted in another essay critiquing the current content and
pedagogy of federal Indian law,
[T]he argument is that if history and treaties are sufficient to
identify these groups as deserving special attention, why curtail the
process-why shouldn't federal Indian law be severely restricted to
a set of general doctrines based on treaty law and statutes univer-
sally applicable to all Indian nations representing deliberate efforts
of Congress to fulfill its trust and/or protectorate responsibilities?
After this section of articulating doctrines of universal applica-
bility, substantial space can be allocated for the respective Indian
nations and their history. There are some federal statutes that have
a general applicability-the General Allotment Act, the Removal
Act, the Indian Reorganization Act, and the Indian Civil Rights
Act. But even within these general laws, numerous exceptions
exist that are created by the separate histories of the respective
tribes. As long as we emphasize the generalities, we do violence
to the rights of Indians as they are articulated specifically in the
history of the tribe with the federal government. I
With this important intellectual and scholarly foundation, by the time I
joined the academy and began offering my own courses, I had begun to
develop (and I continue to add to this list) a set of overarching maxims that
helped me to better understand the distinctive internal political/legal status
of tribal nations and their external intergovernmental and intercultural
relationships with other polities. These maxims are largely a result of
11. Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38
ARIz. L. REv. 963, 969 (1996).
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Deloria's influence, but also because of my own training in political science
and tribal political and legal histories. I begin many of my courses by
setting at least some of these maxims before the students, and then I ask
them to consider these as we move through the historical, legal, and
political materials to be analyzed. The list, at the present time, includes the
following:
As the preexisting sovereigns of the Americas, indigenous nations
are, by definition, nations and have and maintain a pre-constitu-
tional and extra-constitutional status that fundamentally separates
and distinguishes them from all other groups in the United States.
Historical data and the political arrangements (i.e., treaties,
agreements, negotiated settlements, etc.) that emerged during
cross-cultural encounters should and must be determinative of
subordinate legal concepts and doctrines, and not the other way
around.
Political science, history, anthropology, psychology, economics,
and geography, among other fields, provide "critical" perspectives
to Indian policy and intergovernmental relations that law typically
appears unable or unwilling to provide.
The diplomatic record between tribal nations and the other politi-
cal entities confirms the sovereign (separate) status of tribes; while
the trust relationship confirms the politically connected status of
tribal nations to the federal government.
Federal law, including Federal Indian law, is typically presumed to
be rational, uniform, and fair, while the historical record bears out
that it actually operates largely on the basis of political and econo-
mic expediency and depends largely on the personalities of key
policy-making individuals.
Federal Indian law is presumed to be generalizable to all federally-
recognized tribes; but there are profound exceptions that make
such a presumption unrealistic, given the historic and political fact
that most tribes engaged in diplomacy on a nation-to-nation rela-
tionship with the United States and other political powers. There
are many examples where congressional statutes, federal regula-
tions, and supreme court decisions are drafted in a way that they
apply to single tribal nations.
American Indian law or Federal Indian law is sometimes described
as: either the pre-contact organic or traditional laws and customs
2006]
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of tribes; the laws developed by European powers and later the
United States that directly or indirectly affect Indian nations; the
ongoing legal outputs of tribal policy-makers; or some amalgam of
all the above. We must be clear on how we are using the term in a
particular class because when we speak of American Indian law or
the "rule of law," we must be aware of whose rules and whose
laws are being invoked.
The federal government's various branches say they support the
concept of tribal sovereignty while simultaneously maintaining
that the U.S. can exercise plenary (virtually absolute) power over
those same sovereign tribal nations.
Along with these maxims, I have also over the years developed a set of
questions, again, largely influenced by Deloria, but were also derived from
my own reading and analysis of the historical, political, and legal data
pertaining to Native Nations. Many of these queries spawn from the max-
ims described above. The questions, at the moment, include the following:
Since tribal nations are sovereign governments and had no part in
the formation of the U.S. Constitution, and have never formally
been incorporated via the amendment process, absent express
tribal consent or specific statutory language, how can general acts
of Congress be made applicable to tribal nations?
Since tribal nations have a nation-to-nation or government-to-
government relationship with the U.S., based in diplomacy, why
are Supreme Court decisions, like Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,12
involving a specific tribal nation, considered binding precedent on
all other tribal nations?
Since the Constitution under the Commerce Clause expressly
reserves to the Congress the power to regulate trade with tribal
nations, why are state governments, without tribal consent, in-
creasingly getting involved in internal tribal affairs? Can Congress
devolve its constitutional authority for Indian affairs to states
absent tribal consent and without the accompanying treaty and
trust responsibilities attached?
How can the concept of congressional plenary power (defined as
virtually absolute power) over tribal nations coexist in the U.S.,
which fashions itself as a democratic state? Democracy, by
definition, implies limited, not unlimited, power. This is further
12. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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complicated by the fact that individual citizens of tribal nations
have been declared citizens of the U.S. and the state they reside in.
Depending on the course I am teaching, once I have discussed these
maxims and a number of these questions, I then move to the subject matter
of the particular course: American Indian Tribal Government and Politics;
Indigenous Peoples: A Global Perspective; Federal Indian Policy; American
Indian law; American Indian Sovereignty, Law, & Treaty Rights; Tribal
Political Economy; American Indian Diplomacy; or others. For purposes of
this essay, I will narrow my discussion to how I have constructed and teach
a course entitled "American Indians and the Supreme Court." This is a
course that I inherited from Deloria, but one that I significantly modified
given my background in political science.
Before discussing how I teach this course, I must also say that in vir-
tually every course I teach, I include a brief but important couple of classes
defining the six major concepts that overarch and suffuse Federal Indian
policy and law. These concepts include: treaties, the trust doctrine, plenary
power, the discovery doctrine, federalism, and sovereignty (including the
"tribal" variant of that key term). Each of these terms is critical and, with
the exception of federalism, does not generally apply to any other
racial/ethnic/gender group in the continental United States. Each of these
terms, I inform my students, must be fully interrogated both from indige-
nous and non-indigenous perspectives and they must be placed in historical,
social, cultural, political, and legal context to see how and why they arose
when they did and how and why they have been defined across time and in
various intergovernmental situations.
In "American Indians and the Supreme Court," which is a senior level
course, I stress in my syllabus that the decisions of the court have had and
continue to have a profound effect on the status and rights of tribal nations
and have deeply influenced the contours of the tribal/federal/state relation-
ship, despite the fact that tribal nations still exist in an extra-constitutional
position vis-A-vis the United States government. The purpose of the course,
broadly put, is to explore the following question: what is the role and what
has been the practice of the Supreme Court as a policy-making institution
when dealing with indigenous nations and their citizens, who also happen to
enjoy status as U.S. citizens? This broad inquiry requires the students and I
to think both historically and theoretically, to ask about the origins and
exercise of federal judicial power, and to examine the application of federal
law to indigenous peoples and Indian citizens in various areas of law.
I stress to the students that we will be using several methods of analysis
-theoretical, behavioral, institutional, and case study. The course is divided
into several major sections. First, we begin by creating a philosophical and
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theoretical framework through which to judge both the role of the Court and
Indian law decisions. Second, we then briefly look at indigenous legal and
political traditions 3 and assess how these influenced and were in turn influ-
enced by western legal traditions. Third, we then turn to an examination of
the Supreme Court as a political and policy-making institution. This is
most important to establish because while the Court is certainly a legal
entity and writes law, it is first and most fundamentally a profoundly politi-
cal institution and crafts important policy pronouncements, otherwise
known as judicial opinions, as one of three co-equal branches of govern-
ment. Furthermore, the court reeks of politics because the matter of who is
or is not appointed to the court is political. Certainly, how the judicial
nominees traverse the appointment process is political, and how the justices
negotiate as they are drafting their opinions is also an intensely political
process.
Fourth, we then assess the various theories which purport to explain the
inter-institutional role of the Court and the Court's role in national policy-
making. Much of the discussion revolves around how the Court interacts
vis-A-vis with the other branches of government, as well as the question of
whether the Court is primarily supposed to be deferential to the political
branches or whether it is authorized by the Constitution with the power to
initiate policies if the other branches fail to act. Another major question is
whether the Court is supposed to primarily confer legitimacy on the laws
and policies pronounced by the so-called political branches-the Congress
and the President-or does the Court have the inherent authority to act
largely unchecked and craft policy because the justices are life-tenured and
have wide discretionary authority over which cases to decide.
Fifth, we also spend time reading about and discussing a seminal
question: Whether or not indigenous nations are, in fact, an integral part of
13. Since I am not a law professor, although I have an Adjunct Appointment at the law
school at the University of Minnesota, I have only taught the American Indian law course there
once, after Phillip Frickey's departure. But if I were to teach it consistently, I would emphasize,
as Deloria did in much of his work, that if we are to do the subject matter right, and in order to
accord tribal nations the respect their national status entitles them to, that the course currently
titled "federal (or American) Indian law" at most law schools should be redirected and restruc-
tured to present an indigenous oriented body of knowledge that recognizes the preexisting systems
of law and governance already in place within tribes long before Europeans arrived and that also
recognizes the active status of tribal nations even after sustained contact with those foreign bodies.
Such a course would emphasize the retained internal sovereign powers of tribal nations in relation
to domestic law, their external sovereign powers as established under ratified treaty law, and the
unique natural resource and property rights that tribal governments retain. The course would also
emphasize how the natural resources are recognized and sometimes exploited under tribal, federal,
and state law. This structural and pedagogical arrangement for the course was elaborated on by
Deloria. See Deloria, Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, supra
note 11, at 969 (emphasizing a pedagogical rearrangement of Indian law courses).
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the United States Constitution's framework? In other words, do tribal
nations remain extra-constitutional entities, or have they become constitu-
tionally-recognized over the years? Or, do they, in fact, enjoy both
statuses? Finally, after having established the historical, theoretical,
philosophical, and political context, we then read and analyze dozens of
Supreme Court decisions that have left the deepest mark on indigenous
rights and sovereignty. The following subfields are included within the dis-
cussion: indigenous status and federal relations; aboriginal land title and
Indian Country; criminal and civil jurisdiction; taxation and regulatory
jurisdiction; water rights; hunting and fishing rights; claims case appeals;
and individual Indian rights, including citizenship, preference, and religion.
Course requirements for undergraduates include two in-class essay
exams that typically deal with doctrines of law; policy interpretations of the
court's decisions; or the intergovernmental relationship between tribes, the
states, and the federal government. I assign two major writing assignments
for undergraduates and three for graduates or law students. The first paper
that all students are required to write is a critical analysis of a major
Supreme Court decision involving aboriginal issues. The students are ex-
pected to craft a legal/political history of the case in which they detail who
the parties (litigants, lawyers, interest groups) were, what the fact situation
was, a description of the political and historical context, and finally, the
role, if any, of the federal government.
The second paper topic for the students varies. Sometimes I ask them
to select a Supreme Court justice and do a biographical treatment. Other
times I ask them to select a specific treaty and do an analysis of that
document, specifically addressing how its provisions have been dealt with
by the court. At other times, I create a fact situation involving Indian issues
and ask the students to write a decision as if they were a justice. Graduate
and law students are expected to write a third paper that is a Shepard's
citation analysis of a major Indian law decision.
Other requirements include a set of weekly essay questions based on
the week's reading in which the students are expected to put themselves in
the role of an instructor and ask questions based on the materials read.
Finally, each student is expected to be the lead discussant and to write short
political/legal briefs concerning several assigned articles, book chapters,
and court opinions.
The students over the years have found "American Indians and the
Supreme Court" to be the most challenging of the courses I teach because it
demands a great deal of their time and energy, and requires them to ap-
proach the Supreme Court with an open mind. More importantly, the more
astute students find that by having to examine the Court's policy outputs-
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its judicial opinions-from the various disciplinary perspectives that I use, 
and by intensely examining who the justices are and the internal logic of 
their reasoning, methodology, and sometimes selective use of precedent and 
history, that this challenges their basic notions of the alleged fairness and 
impartiality of the law and of the meaning of democracy itself. The stu­
dents come to see that the Court is, indeed, a richly political entity and that 
history, personality, economics, and culture matters and have an effect on 
many of the "opinions" issued by the Court's justices. 
Robert Dahl, a prominent political scientist writing in the 1950s, 
summarized this last issue best when he astutely said of the Court: 
To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a 
legal institution is to underestimate its significance in the 
American political system. For it is also a political institution, an 
institution, that is to say, for arriving at decisions on controversial 
questions of national policy. As a political institution, the Court is 
highly unusual, not least because Americans are not quite willing 
to accept the fact that it is a political institution and not quite 
capable of denying it; so that frequently we take both positions at 
once. This is confusing to foreigners, amusing to logicians, and 
rewarding to ordinary Americans who thus manage to retain the 
best of both worlds. 14 
If we are serious about understanding and then imparting knowledge about 
the distinctive status of indigenous nations' rights, then we should first 
ground ourselves and our students in the "actual" facts of history. We 
should then ground Native rights in treaty law, and we should always 
understand that politics, economics, and culture matters play a determi­
native role in the evolution or regression of the dynamic political/legal 
relationship between tribal nations and the latter-day governments that 
formed on tribal lands. 
14. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker Policy Making in a Democracy: The Role of the United States Supreme Court, 6 J.
PuB. L. 279 (1957) (emphasis in original). 
